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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A~4-103(2)(j), as the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion in refusing to enforce the 
settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") between Appellants Hidden Lake 
Homeowners Association, Barbara Wise, Earthwork Property Management Co., and 
Barbara Wilson (collectively, "Appellants") and Appellee Annabelle Stone ("Stone"), 
and in refusing to award Appellants attorney fees incurred in enforcing the Settlement 
Agreement? 
This Court reviews a refusal to enforce a settlement agreement for abuse of 
discretion. See T.K v. R.C. (In re E.H.), 2004 UT App 419,111, 103 P.3d 177. The 
Court reviews the district court's conclusions of law de novo. See Duke v. Graham, 2007 
UT 31, f^ 12, 158 P.3d 540. It reviews findings of fact for clear error. See Parduhn v. 
Bennett, 2005 UT 22, f 24, 112 P.3d 495. 
This issue was preserved in Appellants' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. 
(R. at 525-593.) 
2. In the event that Appellants prevail on appeal, are they entitled to an award 
of attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal? 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of central importance to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature, Course, and Disposition of Proceedings 
On December 17, 2010, Stone filed a document in the Third Judicial District Court 
styled "Verified Petition for Wrongful Lien Injunction and Damages" (the "Petition") 
against Appellants. (R. at 1-14.) Following oral argument on March 1, 2011, the district 
court dismissed the Petition pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. at 
113.) Following the district court's dismissal, Stone filed numerous motions, including a 
motion pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from the district court's 
judgment. (R. at 294-98.) Stone's son, Todd Stone, also had previously sought leave to 
intervene in the lawsuit. (R. at 67-70.) Perceiving further litigation despite dismissal, 
Appellants initiated settlement discussions that culminated, on August 9, 2011, in the 
Settlement Agreement. (R. at 595.) 
Upon Stone's breach of the Settlement Agreement, on August 24, 2011, 
Appellants Filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement (the "Motion"). (R. 525-
26.) Stone did not timely oppose the Motion. (R. at 693-94.) On October 20, 2011, the 
district court issued a Memorandum Disposition (the "Memorandum Disposition") 
denying the Motion. (R. at 762-65.) In the Memorandum Disposition, the district court 
also denied Stone's Rule 60(b) motion. (R. at 762-65.) On November 2, 2011, the 
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district court entered judgment memorializing and finalizing the rulings contained in the 
Memorandum Disposition, including the district court's denial of the Motion. (R. at 794-
98.) 
Stone appealed the district court's dismissal of the Petition—more specifically, the 
district court's denial of Stone's Rule 60(b) motion. (R. at 799-800.) Appellants cross-
appealed the district court's denial of the Motion. (R. at 801-03.) In a per curiam 
decision entered April 4, 2012, this Court affirmed the district court's denial of Stone's 
Rule 60(b) motion. (R. at 854-57.) See Stone v. Hidden Lakes Condo Association, 2012 
UT App 85, f 5, 275 P.3d 283 (per curiam). The Court further stated as follows: 
A ruling on the issues presented in [Appellants'] cross-appeal is 
deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration of the appeal. 
Hereafter, Hidden Lakes Condo Association, Barbara Wise, Barbara 
Wilson . . . and Earthwork Property Management are designated as the 
Appellants for the remaining portions and briefing of this appeal. 
Appellants should note that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider issues 
arising from the May 17, 2011 final order as the filing of a rule 60(b) 
motion does not toll the time to appeal issues from the underlying 
judgment. . . . Thus, this appeal is limited to the review of the district 
court's November 2, 2011 order, which denied the rule 60(b) motion as 
well as Appellants' motion to enforce the settlement agreement. 
(R. at 857.) See id. 1J5n.l. 
Statement of Facts 
Following the district court's grant of Appellants' motion to dismiss the Petition, 
on June 17, 2011, Appellants' counsel, Ryan B. Braithwaite ("Braithwaite"), sent a letter 
to Stone's then-counsel, David E. Ross II ("Ross"), proposing settlement. (R. at 595, 
602.) At that time, Ross was Stone's formal counsel of record, having filed, only ten 
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days prior, a Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. (R. at 496-98.) 
Among other things, the letter proposed the following: (1) release of the lien in question; 
(2) payment of $17 to Stone; (3) dismissal of the pending district court action and appeal; 
(4) broad language whereby Stone released Appellants from all claims; and (5) agreement 
upon a formalized settlement agreement. (R. at 595-96, 602-03.) 
On June 18, 2011, at 11:24 a.m., Ross sent Braithwaite an email stating, "See 
proposed release and settlement agreement. Let me know if this meets with your 
approval and I will obtain the signatures of my Client." (R. at 596, 605.) Ross's email 
contained, as an attachment, a draft "Settlement Agreement and Release." (R. at 596, 
608-11.) Later on June 18, 2011, at 11:35 a.m., Ross sent Braithwaite a second email 
conveying a proposed stipulation and order dismissing the pending state court action. (R. 
at 596-97, 615-16.) Ross further offered to prepare dismissal documents aimed at 
dismissing the pending appeal. (R. at 613.) 
On June 22, 2011, Braithwaite responded to Ross's emails by attaching copies of 
the proposed settlement agreement and dismissal documents with proposed revisions. (R. 
at 597, 618, 620-24.) On June 27, 2011, Ross emailed Braithwaite, stating, "The 
proposed changes were sent to the Stone's [sic] and waiting for response." (R. at 597, 
626.) 
On July 22, 2011, Ross sent an email to Braithwaite stating as follows: 
Mrs. Stone ok, delay is waiting on definitive response from son, Todd—last 
discussion I had with him was that he was not settling. I propose we 
proceed with the settlement and release with Mrs. Stone along with 
dismissal of the suit, her appeal and lien release. At such point I believe 
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that Todd Stone would have not standing—assuming that he has any to 
begin with—I do not see where the Court allowed him to intervene. 
(R. at 597, 628.) In response, on July 29, 2011, Braithwaite wrote to Ross as follows: 
My clients would obviously prefer to have a global settlement involving 
Todd Stone. However, in light of the facts that he wasn't allowed to 
intervene, his appeal has been dismissed, and he isn't even an owner of a 
unit within the condo association, we're content to proceed with the 
settlement with Mrs. Stone only. 
To that end, I have re-attached a copy of the settlement agreement I 
previously sent to you (and which I understand from your 7/22 email that 
Mrs. Stone has approved) and another version of the settlement that deletes 
the references to Todd Stone. If he is now willing to participate in the 
settlement, then we'd prefer to proceed that way and use the settlement 
agreement to which he is a party. However, if he's not willing to 
participate, then we can use the other attached settlement agreement. 
(R. at 598, 630.) The settlement agreement attached to Braithwaite's July 29, 2011, 
email, to which Todd Stone is not a party, is the Settlement Agreement. (R. at 598, 634-
38.) A copy of the Settlement Agreement (which resides at pages 634-38 of the record 
on appeal) is included in the Addendum for the Court's convenience. 
The Settlement Agreement contains the following language1: 
Mutual Release: Upon execution of this Agreement, each of the parties, 
including and without limitation their respective directors, officers, 
partners, principals, employees, agents, trustees, attorneys, predecessors 
and successors, insurers, parents, subsidiaries and affiliates, divisions, 
assigns, representatives, heirs, and executors and administrators, do hereby 
acknowledge full and complete satisfaction of, and do hereby fully and 
finally settle, release, and discharge each other individually and collectively 
from any and all claims, demands, rights, liabilities, contractual obligations, 
grievances, charges, attorneys' fees, and causes of action of any nature 
under any laws of any jurisdiction, known or unknown, fixed or contingent, 
1
 This language omits redline changes included in the Settlement Agreement, and sets forth the 
language as Stone agreed to it. 
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patent or latent, anticipated or unanticipated, at law or in equity, including 
and without limitation any rights of subrogation, contribution, 
indemnification, or apportionment that may exist in law or equity or by 
contract, that they or any other person had or has or may have against any 
of the others arising from, based upon, relating to, or in connection with the 
Lawsuit, or the facts and circumstances surrounding the Lawsuit, or that 
were asserted in the Lawsuit or the Appeal, could have been asserted in the 
Lawsuit or the Appeal, or exist as of the date of this Agreement. 
(R. at 635-36.) It also contains the following language regarding attorney fees and costs: 
Attorneys Fees: In the event any suit is brought to enforce any of the 
provisions of this Agreement, in addition to any damages which may be 
claimed, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs and 
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection with such action. 
(R. at 637.) 
In response to Braithwaite's July 29, 2012, email, on July 29, Ross emailed 
Braithwaite stating, "I am traveling on business this week and partly next week and then 
end of week . . . meantime will review your attachments—I read quickly and they look 
fine. If any concerns will get back with you otherwise I will send out to Mrs. Stone for 
signature." (R. at 598, 640.) Later, on August 9, 2011, Ross sent an email to Braithwaite 
stating as follows: 
The stipulation and the settlement agreement with your changes comport 
with the settlement agreement. I suggest you obtain your clients and 
earthwork signatures and you sign and send to me. I will sign and obtain 
the signature of Mrs. Stone—then send the Stipulation to you along with a 
conforming proposed order that you can sign the "Approved as to Form" 
part and provide you with an original fully executed settlement agreement. 
You can then file the Stip and proposed order with court and mail me a 
copy of the proposed order after you have signed approved as to form. 
I sent a copy of the proposed stipulation and settlement agreement to Mrs. 
Stone indicating that this was the offer she made to you through me and 
you accepted. 
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(R. at 598-99, 645.) 
Stone subsequently failed and refused to honor the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement. (R. at 599.) On August 18, 2011, Ross filed a motion to withdraw as 
Stone's counsel. (R. at 522-24.) On September 6, 2011, the district court granted that 
motion. (R. at 646.) 
On August 24, 2011, Appellants filed the Motion. (R. at 525-26.) Stone did not 
timely oppose the Motion. On or about September 20, 2011, Stone filed a document, in 
more or less the form of an affidavit, styled "Annabelle Stone's Notice she has NEVER 
Authorized or Engaged in any 'alleged' Settlement Agreement Respondent seeks 
enforce" (the "Notice"). (R. at 693-94.) In that document, Stone generally denied 
agreeing to the Settlement Agreement. (R. at 693.) In a separate document styled 
"Notice of Respondent's Misrepresentation of fact Subject to Perjury Charges related to 
Amounts Alleged to be Due or Attorney Fees," also filed on or about September 20, 
2011, Stone cursorily referenced her Notice and further denied agreeing to the Settlement 
Agreement. (R. at 696.) That was the sum total of Stone's opposition to the Motion. 
On October 20, 2011, the Court issued the Memorandum Disposition, which stated 
as follows regarding the Motion: 
After reviewing the record in this matter and although Petitioner's 
Opposition was untimely and not in compliance with the applicable Rules, 
given her contention that a Settlement Agreement was not reached in this 
case, Respondents' Motion is denied. 
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(R. at 764.) A copy of the Memorandum Disposition is included in the Addendum for the 
Court's convenience. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court abused its discretion by denying the Motion, declining to enforce 
the Settlement Agreement, and declining to award fees to Appellants. The facts in the 
record indicate, without question, a binding settlement agreement between Stone and 
Appellants. Ross was Stone's attorney of record during the course of settlement 
negotiations, and he conveyed Stone's agreement to the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement—a specific document with concrete, definable terms. It is well established in 
Utah that courts may summarily enforce even oral settlement agreements, and Stone's 
attorney possessed apparent authority to bind her to the Settlement Agreement. 
Stone's opposition to the Motion consisted of nothing more than a self-serving 
affidavit that did not address the reality that her attorney had, in fact, already bound her to 
the Settlement Agreement, whether or not she even knew it. The district court's decision 
was based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law and therefore constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. 
The district court abused its discretion by denying the Motion and declining to 
enforce the Settlement Agreement, and by declining to award Appellants attorney fees 
and costs pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. This Court should reverse the district 
court's ruling, enforce the Settlement Agreement as it is set forth in the Addendum to this 
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brief, and remand this issue to the district court for a determination of attorney fees and 
costs to be awarded to Appellants. 
Finally, this Court should also award attorney fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to 
the Settlement Agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DECLINING TO 
ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND BY DECLINING TO 
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES.2 
A. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Declining to Enforce the 
Settlement Agreement. 
As noted above, the district court denied Appellants' motion in a one-sentence 
ruling: 
After reviewing the record in this matter and although Petitioner's 
Opposition was untimely and not in compliance with the applicable Rules, 
given her contention that a Settlement Agreement was not reached in this 
case, Respondents' Motion is denied. 
(R. at 764.) In so ruling, the district court abused its discretion. 
"It is a basic rule that the law favors the settlement of disputes." Mascaro v. 
2
 Although not, strictly speaking, relevant to the issues of the appeal, it is worth noting that for 
Appellants, this is not just an appeal of a $17 settlement agreement. The Court may take judicial 
notice of the fact that its dockets are littered with appeals filed by Stone out of this single district 
court action. To date, she has filed no fewer than seven. See the dockets for Cases Nos. 
20110990-CA, 20110992-CA, 20120046-CA, 20120361-CA, 20120423-CA, 20110383-CA, and 
20110452-CA. The Court may also note Stone's numerous, repetitive, and meritless filings in 
the district court, particularly after the district court dismissed her single claim. As the parties 
that have to defend themselves against Stone's frequent filings (and, apparently, will continue to 
do so into the future), the release language contained in the Settlement Agreement, as well as its 
attorney fee provision, is of significant value to Appellants. 
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Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987). To that end, a "trial court has power to summarily 
enforce on motion a settlement agreement entered into by the litigants where all the 
litigation is pending before it." See Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 
P.2d 605, 609 (Utah 1979). 
"It is of no legal consequence that the parties have not signed a settlement 
agreement." Goodmansen v. Liberty VendingSys., Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993); see also Murray v. State, 137 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Utah 1987) (noting that 
"[t]he fact that plaintiffs had not yet signed a written [settlement] agreement is of no legal 
consequence," and that so long as the statute of frauds does not require a written 
settlement agreement, oral or unsigned settlement agreements are unenforceable); John 
Deere Co. v. A & HEquip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affirming the 
enforceability of oral settlement agreements. "Parties have no right to welch on a 
settlement deal during the sometimes substantial period between when the deal is struck 
and when all necessary signatures can be garnered on a stipulation." Brown v. Brown, 
744 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Orme, J., dissenting) (quoted in Goodmansen, 
866P.2dat585). 
Moreover, a party's counsel may bind the party to a settlement agreement. See 
Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 584-85 (affirming a decision enforcing a settlement agreement 
based on correspondence between counsel). Indeed, parties are bound by the acts of their 
counsel pursuant to the doctrine of apparent authority. See id. at 584; see also 
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Luddington v. BodenvestLtd, 855 P.2d 204, 208-09 (Utah 1993) (outlining the 
parameters of the doctrine of apparent authority). 
Goodmansen, a decision of this Court, is precisely on point. There, counsel 
exchanged several letters memorializing the terms of a settlement agreement between 
counsel's respective clients. Those letters reflected the parties' agreement to the terms 
contained therein. See Goodmans en, 866 P.2d at 583-84. One of the parties declined to 
honor the terms set forth in counsel's correspondence, and counsel for that party 
withdrew. See id. at 584. Although no settlement agreement or other signed settlement 
documents had been executed, the aggrieved party brought a motion to enforce the 
settlement agreement based on the letters between counsel. See id. The district court 
granted the motion. See id. This Court affirmed, concluding that "the three letters 
between [counsel] dated March 22, 1991 constitute a binding agreement between the 
parties." See id. at 585. The Court specifically noted the conveyances of offers and 
acceptances in the letters on behalf of counsel's respective clients. See id. In 
Goodmansen, as here, there was no executed, formalized settlement agreement, and the 
offers and acceptances were exchanged between counsel rather than the parties. Still, the 
district court and this Court enforced the settlement agreement. 
Here, the undisputed record evidence shows that on June 22, 2011, Braithwaite 
sent Ross a draft settlement agreement and dismissal documents reflecting revisions that 
Braithwaite had made to documents Ross had previously provided. (R. at 597, 618, 620-
22.) On June 27, 2011, Ross emailed Braithwaite, stating, "The proposed changes were 
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sent to the Stone's [sic] and waiting for response." (R. at 597, 626.) Later, on July 22, 
2011, Ross sent an email to Braithwaite stating as follows: 
Mrs. Stone ok, delay is waiting on definitive response from son, Todd—last 
discussion I had with him was that he was not settling. / propose we 
proceed with the settlement and release with Mrs. Stone along with 
dismissal of the suit, her appeal and lien release. At such point I believe 
that Todd Stone would have not standing—assuming that he has any to 
begin with—I do not see where the Court allowed him to intervene. 
(Emphasis added.) (R. at 597, 628.) In response, on July 29, 2011, Braithwaite stated as 
follows: 
My clients would obviously prefer to have a global settlement involving 
Todd Stone. However, in light of the facts that he wasn't allowed to 
intervene, his appeal has been dismissed, and he isn't even an owner of a 
unit within the condo association, we're content to proceed with the 
settlement with Mrs. Stone only. 
To that end, I have re-attached a copy of the settlement agreement I 
previously sent to you (and which I understand from your 7/22 email that 
Mrs. Stone has approved) and another version of the settlement that deletes 
the references to Todd Stone. If he is now willing to participate in the 
settlement, then we'd prefer to proceed that way and use the settlement 
agreement to which he is a party. However, if he's not willing to 
participate, then we can use the other attached settlement agreement. 
(R. at 598, 630.) The Settlement Agreement is the document attached to Braithwaite's 
July 29, 2011, email—the version that excluded Todd Stone from its purview. (R. at 598, 
634-38.) 
In response, on July 29, Ross emailed Braithwaite stating, "I am traveling on 
business this week and partly next week and then end of week . . . meantime will review 
your attachments—/ read quickly and they look fine. If any concerns will get back with 
you otherwise I will send out to Mrs. Stone for signature" (Emphasis added.) (R. at 598, 
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640.) Subsequently, on August 9, 2011, Ross sent an email to Braithwaite stating as 
follows: 
The stipulation and the settlement agreement with your changes comport 
with the settlement agreement. I suggest you obtain your clients and 
earthwork signatures and you sign and send to me. I will sign and obtain 
the signature of Mrs. Stone—then send the Stipulation to you along with a 
conforming proposed order that you can sign the "Approved as to Form" 
part and provide you with an original fully executed settlement agreement. 
You can then file the Stip and proposed order with court and mail me a 
copy of the proposed order after you have signed approved as to form. 
/ sent a copy of the proposed stipulation and settlement agreement to Mrs. 
Stone indicating that this was the offer she made to you through me and you 
accepted. 
(R. at 598-99, 645.) (Emphasis added.) 
In this email correspondence, Ross represented twice—once on July 22, 2011, and 
again on August 9, 2011—that Stone accepted and agreed to the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement (as well as the terms of the prior draft insofar as they pertained to her). He 
proceeded to describe a mechanism for obtaining signatures and for orchestrating 
dismissal. He explicitly stated that he told Stone that the Settlement Agreement 
memorialized the offer she had previously made, through Ross, and that her offer had 
been accepted. 
When Ross issued those communications, he was Stone's attorney of record—he 
did not even file a motion to withdraw as her counsel until after Stone had breached the 
Settlement Agreement. (R. at 522-24.) As such, he possessed apparent authority to bind 
3
 As Braithwaite explained to Ross, the Settlement Agreement differed from the prior draft only 
insofar as it omitted Todd Stone. 
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Stone. See Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 584. Indeed, the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct prohibited Braiihvjdite from speaking directly with Stone, a represented party. 
See Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 4.2(a). Ross was the only person with whom Braithwaite 
could discuss settlement. Stone cannot hire a lawyer, require all communications to go 
through him, and then "welch" on her deal by claiming that the attorney did not speak for 
her after all. 
The Settlement Agreement itself clearly addresses all material terms and is 
unambiguous in its provisions. (R. at 634-38.) There can be no doubt that it evidences a 
meeting of the minds on all essential terms. 
In the face of this mountain of evidence, Stone submitted a sole, conclusory, self-
serving affidavit stating simply that she did not agree to the Settlement Agreement. (R. at 
693-94.) But even assuming the truth of Stone's statement, pursuant to Goodmansen and 
established Utah case law describing the doctrine of apparent authority, it is irrelevant 
that she did not personally "agree" to the Settlement Agreement. Her attorney, who was 
her agent, possessed of apparent authority, agreed to it on her behalf. See Goodmansen, 
866 P.2d at 584-85. Literally, Stone set forth no evidence contradicting Appellants' 
argument or the facts upon which it was based. The district court's decision to credit 
Stone's conclusory, self-serving testimony above her counsel's prior, undisputed 
statements binding her to the Settlement Agreement—the only statements that are legally 
significant—is legal error, and the district court abused its discretion by basing its 
decision on that error. See Taylor-West Weber Water Improv. Dist. v. Olds, 2009 UT 86, 
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If 3, 224 P.3d 709 ("The district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an erroneous 
conclusion of law to come to its decision.'5). 
In fine, the undisputed record evidence before the Court bespeaks a fully 
enforceable settlement agreement between Appellants and Stone. Stone agreed to the 
Settlement Agreement. This Court should reverse the district court's decision denying 
the Motion, and it should enforce the Settlement Agreement. Specifically, but without 
limitation, the Court should enforce the following language regarding Stone's release of 
Appellants, as well as her agreement to pay attorney fees and costs incurred in enforcing 
the Settlement Agreement: 
Mutual Release: Upon execution of this Agreement, each of the parties, 
including and without limitation their respective directors, officers, 
partners, principals, employees, agents, trustees, attorneys, predecessors 
and successors, insurers, parents, subsidiaries and affiliates, divisions, 
assigns, representatives, heirs, and executors and administrators, do hereby 
acknowledge full and complete satisfaction of, and do hereby fully and 
finally settle, release, and discharge each other individually and collectively 
from any and all claims, demands, rights, liabilities, contractual obligations, 
grievances, charges, attorneys' fees, and causes of action of any nature 
under any laws of any jurisdiction, known or unknown, fixed or contingent, 
patent or latent, anticipated or unanticipated, at law or in equity, including 
and without limitation any rights of subrogation, contribution, 
indemnification, or apportionment that may exist in law or equity or by 
contract, that they or any other person had or has or may have against any 
of the others arising from, based upon, relating to, or in connection with the 
Lawsuit, or the facts and circumstances surrounding the Lawsuit, or that 
were asserted in the Lawsuit or the Appeal, could have been asserted in the 
Lawsuit or the Appeal, or exist as of the date of this Agreement. 
(R. at 635-36.) 
Attorneys Fees: In the event any suit is brought to enforce any of the 
provisions of this Agreement, in addition to any damages which may be 
claimed, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs and 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection with such action. 
(R. at 637.) 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion by Declining to Enter an 
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs in Appellants' Favor. 
The Settlement Agreement contains the following language: 
Attorneys Fees. In the event any suit is brought to enforce any of the 
provisions of this Agreement, in addition to any damages which may be 
claimed, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs and 
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection with such action. 
(R. at 637.) When a party successfully enforces a settlement agreement, Utah courts also 
enforce the agreement's attorney fee provision. See Goodmansen, 866 P.2d at 586 
(affirming district court's enforcement of settlement agreement and attorney fee 
provision). 
Here, because the district court should have enforced the Settlement Agreement, 
and because the Settlement Agreement contains a provision awarding fees and costs to a 
prevailing party seeking to enforce the Settlement Agreement, the district court further 
abused its discretion by declining to award Appellants their fees and costs incurred in 
enforcing the Settlement Agreement. In addition to reversing the district court's decision 
declining to enforce the Settlement Agreement, the Court should remand this case to the 
district court for a determination of attorney fees and costs owing for litigation before that 
court to enforce the Settlement Agreement. 
II. CROSS-APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS INCURRED ON APPEAL, 
"If the trial court determines that a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees by 
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law, the party may also recover its attorney fees on appeal." PP&T, LLC v. Brinar, Case 
No. 20070538-CA, 2008 UT App 198, *4 (2008) (unpublished disposition) (citing Coates 
v. Am. Economy Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1981)). Utah appellate courts award 
attorney fees and costs on appeal where there is a contractual basis for doing so. See 
Oakwood Vill LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2005 UT 101, \ 57, 104 P.3d 1226 (affirming an 
award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to contract). 
Here, as explained above, the Settlement Agreement is enforceable, and 
Appellants are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with 
its enforcement. That enforcement has taken Appellants to this Court. This Court should 
therefore award Appellants their attorney fees and costs on appeal, in addition to 
remanding to the district court for a determination of attorney fees and costs incurred 
there. Appellants reserve the right to submit a declaration of costs and attorney fees upon 
the Court's entry of a ruling on the substantive issues in the case. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court abused its discretion by denying the Motion, declining to enforce 
the Settlement Agreement, and declining to award attorney fees and costs. In abusing its 
discretion, the district court rested its ruling on a faulty understanding of applicable law. 
This Court should correct that mistake: it should reverse the district court's denial of the 
Motion, enforce the settlement agreement, and remand to the district court for a 
determination of attorney fees and costs incurred there, and with instructions that the 
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district court award those fees and costs to Appellant. This Court should also award 
attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of July, 2012 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
^Kyan B. Braithwaite 
Daniel K. Brough 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Memorandum Decision entered October 20, 2011 
2. Settlement Agreement attached to Braithwaite's July 29, 2011, email to 
Ross 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI§ft?<§^0ff 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE QF_UTAHTUKECOUN1 
ANNABELLE STONE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
HIDDEN LAKES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, BARBARA WISE, 
EARTHWORK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 
CO., and BARBARA WILSON, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 100925189 
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
"tycie*" 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
pending motions/filings. As background, this case came before 
the Court for hearing on March 1, 2011. Based upon the evidence 
presented at the hearing, the Court, on March 28, 2011, entered 
an order granting Respondents' Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. 
The Court requested additional briefing in connection with 
Respondents' request for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. 
On April 14, 2011, the matter again came before the Court for a 
hearing regarding Respondents' request for fees. On May 16, 
2011, the Court entered an Order denying the requested fees. 
Plaintiff's April 14, 2011 Filed Rule 60b Motion 
Turning initially to Plaintiff's April 14, 2011 filed Rule 
60b Motion, with this motion, Petitioner seeks relief from the 
Court's March 29, 2011 Order granting Respondents' Motion to 
Dismiss. As this Court has already determined, the lien recorded 
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STONE v. HIDDEN LAKE Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
against Petitioner's property is a statutory lien that is 
excluded from the purview of the wrongful lien act. While 
Petitioner has reargued her same statutory provisions, such have 
been ruled as, and continue to be, inapplicable. Accordingly, 
Plaintiff's April 14, 2011 Filed Rule 60b Motion is, denied. 
Petitioner's Motion Related to Plaintiff's Notice of Court's 
Misinterpretation of Statutory Lien Law Affording Respondent 
Preferential & Unjust Consideration at Plaintiff s Expense and 
Petitioner's 2nd Motion Related to Plaintiff's Notice of Court's 
Misinterpretation of Statutory Lien Law Affording Respondent 
Preferential & Unjust Consideration at Plaintiff's Expense 
After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court 
concludes these motions are effectively motions for 
reconsideration and even if considered, such are untimely and 
reiterate information, statements, and arguments that have been 
made and ruled upon on several previous occasions. The 
aforementioned motions are denied. 
Petitioner's Notice of Respondent's Misrepresentation of Fact 
Subject To Perjury Charges Related to Amounts Alleged To Be Due 
Or Attorney Fees. 
This filing is a re-argument of issues upon which this Court 
has already ruled and for which there are not appropriate grounds 
to set that ruling aside. The Court's prior rulings in this case 
will remain as the law of the case. 
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STONE v. HIDDEN LAKE Page 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Respondents' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
After reviewing the record in this matter and although 
Petitioner's Opposition was untimely and not in compliance with 
the applicable Rules, given her contention that a Settlement 
Agreement was not reached in this case, Respondents' Motion is 
denied. 
Petitioner's Rule 42 Motion to Consolidate. 
With this motion, Petitioner seeks to consolidate four cases 
"to accommodate the statutory requirements afforded Joanne Stone 
as needing to be given proper notice of any or all court hearings 
and rulings affecting her property interests or rights that 
respondents have failed to give such proper notice of their 
unenforceable lien." 
Because the cases do not involve common questions of law or 
fact, consolidation of this matter with any other case is not 
appropriate under Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Accordingly, Petitioner's Rule 42 Motion to Consolidate is 
denied. /_ 
.i-4 DATED this / 7 day of October, 2011 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE 
The parties to this Settlement Agreement and Release ("Agreement") are 
Annabelle Stone, an individual and Plaintiff, and Annabelle Lund Stone as Trustee of the 
Annabelle Lund Stone Family Trust u/a/d April 16. 2001 and Todd Stone. Annabelle 
Stone's son and an interested party (collectively referred to as "Stone") and Hidden Lake 
Homeowner's Association. Hidden Lake Condominium Homeowners Association. Inc., 
Barbara Wise, Barbara Wilson. Earthwork. Earthwork Landscaping. Inc. and Earthwork 
Property Management Co., Defendants (collectively referred to as "Hidden Lake") and 
have entered into this Agreement this —day of JmaeAugust 2011. 
RECITALS 
1. Stone has asserted claims against Hidden Lake in case No. 100925189 in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City Department, (the 
"Lawsuit"). 
2. The Court dismissed Stone's claim and Stone appealed the dismissal to the Utah 
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, Appellate Nos. 20110383 and 20110452 (the "Appeal"). 
3. None of the parties to this Agreement admit any fault or wrongdoing. 
4. By this Agreement, the parties fully settle all disputes between them, without 
admission of liability or fault, which have been or shcould have been brought in 
connection with the above referenced lLawsuit. 
5. Hidden Lake on November 18, 2009 recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office a Notice of Claim of Lien (the "Lien") as Entry No. 10841222 against Stone^s 
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condominium unit within the Hidden Lake Condominiums for which the subject 
ILawsuit ensued seeking its release. 
TERMS 
In exchange for their mutual promises, the parties to this Agreement agree as 
follows: 
6. Lien Release: Hidden Lake hereby agrees to immediately cause the release of the 
Lien upon receipt by it from Stone of the interest owed that the parties have agreed is 
$17.00 and upon receipt of a copy of the Agreement executed by Stone. 
7. Mutual Release: Upon execution of this Agreement, each of the parties, including 
and without limitation their respective directors, officers, partners, principals, 
employees, agents, trustees, attorneys, predecessors and successors, insurers, parents, 
subsidiaries and affiliates, divisions, assigns, representatives, heirs, and executors and 
administrators, do hereby acknowledge full and complete satisfaction of, and do 
hereby fully and finally settle, release, and discharge each other individually and 
collectively from any and all claims, demands, rights, liabilities, contractual 
obligations, grievances, charges, attorneys' fees, and causes of action of any nature 
under any laws of any jurisdiction, known? or unknown, fixed or contingent, patent or 
latent, anticipated or unanticipated, at law or in equity, including and without 
limitation any rights of subrogation, contribution, indemnification, or apportionment 
that may exist in law or equity or by contract, that they or any other person had or has 
or may have against any of the others arising from, based upon, relating to, or in 
connection with the Lawsuit, or the facts and circumstances surrounding the Lawsuit 
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or that were asserted in the Lawsuit or the Appeal could have been asserted in the 
Lawsuit or the Appeal or exist as of the date of this Agreement. 
8. Dismissal of Litigation: Upon release of the Lien as described above, the parties, 
through their respective counsel, shall file a stipulation and order of dismissal with 
prejudice of the Lawsuit and Stone shall immediately dismiss the Appeal as described 
herein. Each party to the Lawsuit shall bear its costs, expenses and attorneys' fees in 
connection with the Lawsuit, the Appeal and in connection with the execution of this 
Agreement. 
9. No Admission: It is understood and agreed that this Agreement is not an admission 
of liability on behalf of any party. 
10. No Other Representations: The parties each represent and acknowledge that, in 
executing this Agreement, they do not rely and have not relied upon any 
representation or statement made by each other (except as set forth in this 
Agreement), or by any agents, representative, or attorneys of the others with regard to 
the subject matter, basis, or fact of this Agreement. 
11. Integration: All understandings and agreements heretofore had or made between the 
parties are merged in this Agreement, which alone fully and completely express their 
agreement relating to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement shall not be 
amended or modified, except in a writing signed by all parties hereto. 
12. Approval by Attorneys: The parties each acknowledge that they are entering into this 
Agreement having fully reviewed the terms hereof, and the legal effect of their 
signing this Agreement, in consultation with their respective legal counsel. 
13. Successors and Assigns: This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
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benefit of the Parties hereto and their respective heirs, successors, and assigns. No 
Party to this Agreement may assign their rights or obligations hereunder without the 
prior written consent of the other parties hereto. 
14. Governing Law: This Agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with 
the laws of the State of Utah. 
15. Attorneys Fees: In the event any suit is brought to enforce any of the provisions of 
this Agreement, in addition to any damages which may be claimed, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to recover its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in 
connection with such action. 
16. Counterparts: This Agreement may be executed in counterparts. 
17. Authorization: Each of the persons signing below on behalf of the parties specifically 
represents and acknowledges that they have been authorized to do so by the party on 
whose behalf they have signed this Settlement Agreement. 
Agreed and Accepted: 
Annabelle Stone, individually Date 
Annabelle Lund Stone Family Trust u/a/d April 16. 2004 
BY ; 
Annabelle Lund Stone, Trustee Date 
Hidden Lake Condominium Homeowners Association, Inc. 
BY 
Barbara Wise, Board Member Date 
Hidden Lake Homeowners Association 
BY 
Barbara Wise, Board Member Date 
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Barbara Wise, individually Date 
Barbara Wilson, individually Date 
Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere 
BY 
Todd Stone, individually Date 
Earthwork Property Management Co. 
BY 
Steven Breitling Date 
Earthwork 
BY 
Steven Breitling 
Earthwork Landscaping, Inc. 
BY 
Steven Breitling 
Date 
Date 
Ryan B. Braithwaite Dated 
Attorneys for Defendants 
David E. Ross II 
Attorney for Plaintiff & Todd Stone 
Dated 
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